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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Military Law-PERSONS SUBJECT TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE. United States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363
(1970).
Raymond G. Averette was convicted by a general court-martial of
conspiracy to commit larceny and attempted larceny of thirty-six thou-
sand United States Government owned batteries.1 At the time of the
offenses, Raymond Averette was a civilian employee of a private firm
in Sdi-gon, Republic of Vietnam.2 Court-martial jurisdiction over the
person of the accused was founded upon article 2(10) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.3
The Court of Military Review reduced the sentence but affirmed the
jurisdictional basis of the court-martial. On petition of the accused, the
Court of Military Appeals granted review and reversed the proceedings
below. The court held that only in time of declared war are civilians
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.6
The Code contains three groups of special provisions which are oper-
able only "in time of war." 7 The determination of when a state of war
1. United States v. Averette, C.M. 419556, aff'd, 40 C.M.R. 891 (1969), rev'd, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 363,41 C.M.R. 363 (1970).
2. Mr. Averette was employed by Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc. This firm
was under contract to the United States forces in the Republic of Vietnam to
perform post utilities functions.
3. 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1964) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ]: "The following persons
are subject to this chapter:
(10) In time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the
field...."
4. United States v. Averette, 40 C.M.R. 891 (1969).
5. United States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970).
6. Id. at 365, 41 C.M.R. at 365.
7. (a) The maximum penalty for certain offenses is changed "in time of war." The
following offenses are punishable by death only "in time of war": desertion, UCMJ
art. 85(c), 10 U.S.C. § 885(c) (1964); assaulting an officer, UCMJ art. 90, 10 U.S.C.
S 890 (1964); and misbehavior of a sentinel, UCMJ art. 113, 10 U.S.C. § 913 (1964).
Other offenses are cognizable only "in time of war": misconduct as a prisoner,
UCMJ art. 105, 10 U.S.C. § 905 (1964); and spying, UCMJ art. 106, 10 U.S.C. § 906
(1964).
(b) The two-year statute of limitations for desertion and absence without leave,
UCMJ art. 43(c), 10 U.S.C. § 843(c) (1964), is suspended indefinitely "in time of
war." UCMJ art. 43(a), 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1964).
(c) Civilians accompanying an armed force in the field are subject to the UCMJ
only "in time of war." UCMJ art. 2(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1964).
See generally Note, Military Law-"In Time of War" Under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice: An Elusive Standard, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 841 (1969).
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exists has prompted considerable litigation. The Supreme Court recog-
nized as early as 1800 that a state of war could exist without a formal
declaration by Congress.8 Later a United States circuit court also found
that a formal declaration was not requisite to finding the existence of
a state of war.' The court remarked that the judicial branch was bound
by political determinations of the issue.10
Traditionally, the Court of Military Appeals has approached this
problem with a view to the pragmatic. United States v. Bancroft set
forth what were considered the relevant criteria for finding a state of
war.'-1 The court then stated that ". .. it matters not whether the au-
thorization for the military activities in Korea springs from Congressional
declarations, United Nations Agreements or orders by the Chief Ex-
ecutive." 12 In United States v. Anderson,3 the court applied similar
reasoning in deciding that on November 3, 1964-and presumably at
all times since that date-a state of war existed in the Republic of
Vietnam.
The Averette case combined the problem of finding a satisfactory
interpretation of the words "in time of war" with the delicate constitu-
tional question of the extent of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians.' 4
Historically, the Supreme Court has viewed military authority over civil-
ians with distaste.' 5 In a rapid succession of decisions from 1955 through
1969 the Court has made its position with respect to court-martial juris-
8. The Eliza v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
9. Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 F. 445 (C.C. Kan. 1905) (The Boxer Rebellion
constituted a time of war).
10. Id. at 449.
11. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953). The court said:
We believe a finding that this is a time of war, within the meaning of
the language of the Code, is compelled by the very nature of the present
conflict; the manner in which it is carried on; the movement to, and
the presence of large numbers of American men and women on the
battlefields of Korea; the casualties involved; the sacrifices required; the
drafting of recruits to maintain the large number of persons in the
military service; the national emergency legislation enacted and being
enacted; the executive orders promulgated; and the tremendous sums being
expended for the express purpose of keeping our Army, Navy and Air
Force in the Korean theatre of operations.
Id. at 5.
12. Id.
13. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968).
14. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 365,41 C.M.R. at 365.
15. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wail.) 2 (1866).
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diction abundantly clear. In Toth v. Quarles"' the Court held that the
Constitution forbade the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over a
former serviceman for a violation of military law committed while he
was a member of the service, but not prosecuted until after he was dis-
charged. Two years later the Court, on similar reasoning, reversed two
court-martial convictions of civilian dependents accompanying military
members overseas.' 7 Finally, in O'Callahan v. Parker8 the Court refused
to allow court-martial jurisdiction over a military member without a
showing that the offense was "service connected."
The holding in Averette captures "'the Spirit of O'Callaban, and...
the ... precedents there reviewed . '... " 19 By restricting the "in time
of war" activating clause of article 2 (10) of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice to times of declared war, the court avoids the constitutional
question of the extent of Congressional power to subject civilians to
court-martial jurisdiction.
The Court of Military Appeals distinguishes this approach from its
earlier holdings on the question of when a state of war exists, and there-
by allows those interpretations to remain undisturbed. 20 It now appears
that where special provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
are activated by an "in time of war" clause two distinct criteria apply.
16. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
17. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). This decision applied only to capital crimes.
The Court soon abrogated this distinction by extending the prohibition to trial of
civilians by court-martial, in time of peace, to all offenses. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960) (non-capital crime, civilian dependent); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
(1960) (capital crime, civilian employee); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960)
(non-capital crime, civilian employee). See generally Girard, The Constk:ution and
Court-Martial of Civilians Acctnnpanying the Arned Forces-A Preliminary Analysis,
13 STAN. L. REv. 461 (1961).
18. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See generally Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or
Millstone in Military Justice?, 1969 DuKE L. J. 853 (1969); Nelson & Westbrook,
Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of
O'Callaban v. Parker, 54 MIrN. L. R~v. 1 (1969); Note, Court-Martial jurisdiction:
The Effect of O'Callaban v. Parker, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 508 (1969).
19. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 364, 41 C.M.R. at 364, quoting from Latney v. Ignatius, 416
F.2d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
20. Id. at 365, 41 C.M.R. at 365. The court distinguishes its earlier holdings on two
grounds: that the accused in the earlier cases had always been a military member, and
that the earlier interpretations of the "in time of war" clauses had concerned pro-
cedural or substantive matters rather than jurisdictional as in Averett. In this context,
the court appears to treat the UCMJ as merely a collection of statutes, each amenable
to individual interpretation. However, the UCMJ purports to be a code, and as such
it should not be capable of such construction.
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First, where the provisions deal with the severity of a penalty2l or the
statute of limitations22 the pragmatic criteria of United States v. Ban-
croft' are used to determine when a state of war exists. But when deal-
ing with the extension of court-martial jurisdiction to include civilians,
the special provision is activated only by a formal declaration of war
by Congress.24
CHARLES W. BOOHAR, JR.
21. United States v. Sanders, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 21, 21 C.M.R. 147 (1956); United States
v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953).
22. United States v. Shell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 21 C.M.R. 147 (1956); United States
v. Ayers, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 15 C.M.R. 220 (1954).
23. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953).
24. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 365, 41 C.M.R. at 365.
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